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GLOBAL MAPPING 
AND ANALYSIS OF  
ANTI-VEHICLE MINE 
INCIDENTS IN 2016
THE HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACT OF ANTI-VEHICLE MINES
GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, 
cluster munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine action 
organisations and other human security organisations. We support the ultimate 
goal of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and promoting 
development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 
55 staff members from over 15 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique 
and international centre of mine action expertise and knowledge. Our work is made 
possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 
20 governments and organisations.
STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI)
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, 
armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, 
analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, 
media and the interested public. The SIPRI Governing Board is not responsible for 
the views expressed in the publications of the Institute.
Governing Board: Ambassador Sven-Olof Petersson, Chairman (Sweden); 
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria); Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar (Indonesia); 
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky (Russia); Espen Barthe Eide (Norway);  
Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany); Professor Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom); 
Dr Radha Kumar (India) and the Director.
This report was prepared by Emma Bjertén-Günther (SIPRI), Ursign Hofmann (GICHD), Yeonju Jung (SIPRI) 
and Pascal Rapillard (GICHD).
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4 | Key findings
• In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents related, or suspected to be 
related, to anti-vehicle mines (AVMs)1 in 22 states and territories, an increase of 
2 per cent compared to 2015. These incidents caused 423 casualties,2 including 228 
injured and 195 killed, a decrease of 29 per cent in comparison to 2015.
• Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mali, Pakistan, and Ukraine were the five states with the 
most recorded AVM incidents in 2016. All states, besides Afghanistan, featured 
among the top five states with the most incidents in the previous year.
• Afghanistan, Mali, Pakistan, Syria and Ukraine were the states with the highest 
casualty rates in 2016. The 101 casualties recorded in Ukraine represent a 4 per cent 
increase since 2015 and account for 24 per cent of global casualties.
• In post-conflict situations, 87 per cent of casualties were civilians, while in conflict 



















The GICHD and SIPRI wish to extend sincere thanks to all partner organisations that 
responded to the survey and provided data, in particular:
The following mine action programmes also provided valuable responses and data:
• United Nations Development Programme
• United Nations Mine Action Service
• Ambassadors for Development without 
Borders, Iran
• APOPO
• “Dales Voz a Las Víctimas” platform
• Danish Demining Group
• iMMAP
• Landmine Monitor
• Mines Advisory Group
• Norwegian People’s Aid
• Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine
• Peace Sharing Association/Korean 
Campaign to Ban Landmines
• Sustainable Peace and Development 
Organization, Pakistan
• The HALO Trust
• Zamin Pak Persia International Company
• Albanian Mines and Munitions Coordination 
Office
• Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action
• Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center
• Cambodian Mine Action and Victim 
Assistance Authority
• Center for Humanitarian Demining and 
Expertise, Armenia
• Centre National d’Action Antimines au Sénégal
• Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas 
Antipersonal
• Comisión Nacional de Desminado 
Humanitario, Chile
• Comissâo Nacional Intersectorial de 
Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, 
Angola
• Croatian Mine Action Centre
• Dirección para la Acción Integral contra 
Minas Antipersonal, Colombia
• Direction de l’Action Humanitaire contre les 
Mines et Engins non explosés, Burundi
• Executive Secretariat for the Demining and 
Development of the North West Coast, Egypt
• Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, 
Mozambique
• Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency
• Israeli National Mine Action Authority
• Kosovo Mine Action Centre
• Lebanon Mine Action Center
• Mine Action Coordination Centre of 
Afghanistan
• Ministère de la Défense du Cameroun
• National Mine Action Center, Sri Lanka
• Palestine Mine Action Centre
• South Sudan National Mine Action Authority
• STC Delta, Georgia
• Tajikistan Mine Action Centre
• Thailand Mine Action Centre
• The National Committee for Demining and 
Rehabilitation, Jordan
• Yemen Executive Mine Action Center
• Zambia Mine Action Centre




The need for systematic data collection on AVM incidents was first recognised 
during joint research by the GICHD and SIPRI for a study on the humanitarian and 
developmental impact of anti-vehicle mines published in October 2014.3 As a response, 
both organisations have been collecting global data on AVM incidents since 2015 with a 
view to improving evidence on and identifying trends in AVM impact. Data are available 

















This report presents and analyses AVM incident data from 2016. It follows up on and 
compares findings with a first report of its kind: “Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-
Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2015”, released in April 2016.5
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Data in this report stem from field reports from states, mainly national mine action 
authorities/centres, as well as mine action and other humanitarian organisations, and 
from media reviews in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish and Urdu.
Out of a total of 181 recorded incidents in 2016, 79 are based on field reports from 
45 mine action programmes and organisations, and 102 from media sources. A more 
detailed description of the methodology and challenges of this research is available in 
Annex 1.
Feedback from
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8 | Global trends
The GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents in 2016 that were related or suspected 
to be related to AVMs in 22 states and territories.7 This represents a minor increase 
compared to 2015, when 178 incidents were recorded in 25 states and territories.8 
The highest number of incidents were found in Ukraine, Mali, Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Cambodia (see Table 1). New states in 2016 include Azerbaijan, Israel, Lebanon, Rwanda 
and South Korea.
As in 2015, Ukraine and Mali were the states with most incidents in 2016, totalling 
35 per cent of all incidents globally. Ukraine alone accounted for 37 incidents – a 
significant increase compared to the 25 incidents the year before.
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In total, 423 casualties were recorded including 195 dead and 228 injured. This is a 
decrease of 29 per cent compared to the previous year (598 casualties). The previous 
trend was an increase in casualties and it is too early to say whether 2016 represents a 
reversal of this trend or whether it was an outlier year. Corroborating last year’s GICHD 
and SIPRI findings, the Landmine Monitor also registered a notable spike in AVM 
casualties in 2015 compared to previous years.9
The vast majority of incidents recorded by the GICHD and SIPRI in 2016 occurred in 
current conflict settings. 144 incidents (80 per cent) and 371 casualties (88 per cent) were 
found in conflict settings.10 This is comparable to 2015, when 81 per cent of incidents 
and 91 per cent of casualties were found in conflict situations.
Data also testify to the sustained – and proportionally growing – humanitarian and 
developmental impact of AVMs in relation to other mines and explosive remnants of 
war (ERW) in states long after conflict has ended. For example, while Cambodia noted 
a 25 per cent drop in overall mines/ERW casualties from 2015 to 2016 (from 111 to 83),12 
the number of AVM casualties remained fairly stable: 17 in 2015 and 16 in 2016.
FIGURE 2
Absolute numbers are: Ukraine 101, Mali 55, Pakistan 52, Syria 38, Afghanistan 34, Yemen 32, 
Egypt 21, Cambodia 16, India 12, Western Sahara 12, Angola 10, Tunisia 10, Iran 9, Chad 7, Rwanda 5, 
South Sudan 3, Lebanon 2, Azerbaijan 1, Israel 1, Somalia 1, South Korea 1, Nigeria 0
HEAT MAP OF ALL STATES AND TERRITORIES WITH RECORDED  
INCIDENTS IN 2016 11
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For the first time in four years, an AVM incident was recorded in South Korea in 2016 
– a further incident occurred only a few weeks later in January 2017. This is a reminder 
of the legacy of contamination stemming from decades of military tensions.13
The Korean War from 1950 to 1953 ended with an Armistice Agreement.14 
Since then, AVMs have posed a threat to both security forces and civilians. The 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ)15 still remain among 
the most mine-affected areas in the world due to extensive contamination by mines 
laid during the Korean War, during the 1960s, as well as in 1978 and 1988. The CCZ is 
still not safe for people to access,16 as many of these areas have no signs to indicate 
where the mines are.17
The incident in 2016 occurred when an AVM was triggered during road construction 
in the CCZ, killing a dump-truck driver, despite previous clearance work. The incident 
drew renewed attention to the importance of demining in South Korea.18
BOX 1
FIGURE 3 THE DMZ AND CCZ BORDERLANDS

































Figure adapted from Kwi-gon Kim and Dong-Gil Cho (2005), “Status and Ecological Resource  
Value of the Republic of Korea’s De-militarized Zone”, Landscape and Ecological Engineering,  
vol. 1, p. 4. Reproduced with permission from Springer
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CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES
Categories of reported casualties (killed and injured) are represented in Figure 4. 
Civilians overall accounted for 46 per cent of total casualties (196 out of 423), while 
national security forces comprised 39 per cent (163 casualties).19 As in the previous year, 
peacekeepers, international security forces, other combatants and unknown casualties 
accounted for a smaller fraction of the total.20
The percentage of overall civilian casualties decreased substantially from 60 per cent 
in 2015 to 46 per cent in 2016, while a notable proportionate increase was observed 
for casualties from national security forces from 28 per cent to 39 per cent in the same 
period.
FIGURE 4
© GICHD – SIPRI
Absolute numbers are: 196 civilians (incl. 2 humanitarian personnel), 
163 national security forces, 25 other combatants, 20 peacekeepers, 
4 international security forces, 15 unknown
= 10 people
  46% 
 Civilians
  39% 
 National security forces
  6% 
 Other combatants
  5% 
 Peacekeepers
  1% 
 International security forces
  4% 
 Unknown
CATEGORIES OF CASUALTIES 21
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In conflict settings, civilians accounted for 62 per cent of casualties in 2015, where 
disaggregated data were available (Figure 5). This figure dropped to 40 per cent in 2016.
In post-conflict situations, civilians accounted for 87 per cent of casualties in 2016 
compared to 73 per cent the year before. This high ratio of civilian casualties in post-
conflict settings may be expected, since the presence of military personnel is typically 
lower than in ongoing conflicts.
The impact of large incidents on data variance may also be noted. In 2015, one single 
incident in Mali killed four and injured 28 civilians when a civilian bus detonated a 
suspected AVM 45 km from Gao, near the village of N’Tillit. These 32 casualties alone 
represented no less than 5 per cent of total casualties in 2015. The largest incident 
recorded in 2016 occurred in the Donetsk region in Ukraine when a minibus hit a 
suspected AVM, resulting in 15 civilian casualties.
Conflict
Post-conflict
FIGURE 5 CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS IN CONFLICT VS POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS





Absolute numbers are: (conflict) 144 civilians, 212 non-civilians;  
(post-conflict) 45 civilians, 7 non-civilians
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For two consecutive years, Ukraine has been the state with the most AVM-related 
incidents and highest number of casualties. In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 
37 incidents with 101 casualties, including 43 dead and 58 injured. Ukraine therefore 
accounted for 20 per cent of all recorded incidents and 24 per cent of all casualties 
globally. Compared to 2015, this represents a 48 per cent spike in incidents and a 
4 per cent increase in the number of casualties.
While old mines dating from World War I and World War II continue to be discovered 
in Ukraine 22, recorded AVM incidents in 2016 took place in Luhansk and Donetsk 
oblasts, where conflict between government and separatist forces erupted in 2014 
(Figure 6).
AVM contamination affected 
non-civilians in particular: 
69 per cent of the casualties, 
where disaggregation was 
possible, which is higher 
than the global average 
of 60 per cent in conflict 
contexts. This corroborates a 
trend observed in 2015 when 
64 per cent of the casualties 
in Ukraine were non-civilians.
The mines not only caused 
casualties, but had detri-
mental socio-economic 
effects, preventing people 
from using agricultural land 
for crops and livestock, 
which are the main means of 
subsistence.23 They were also 
an obstacle to the repair of 
infrastructure, such as water 
and gas supply, and limited the monitoring of the implementation of the Minsk 
Agreements 24 by the Special Monitoring Mission of the Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).25
BOX 2
FIGURE 6 MAP OF AVM INCIDENTS IN UKRAINE

































© Base map: International Crisis Group;  
AVM incidents: GICHD-SIPRI
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CASUALTIES BY SEX AND AGE
The 2016 data reconfirm the challenges observed in the 2015 report. Sex-disaggregated 
data were only available for 45 per cent (189 casualties) of total casualties in 83 incidents. 
Where disaggregated data were available, men were disproportionaly affected 
FIGURE 7
Sex disaggregation





















Absolute numbers are: 160 male, 29 female
Absolute numbers are: 128 adults, 26 children
Age disaggregation
154 out of 423 (36%) casualties 
with age-disaggregated data
© GICHD – SIPRI
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by AVMs: in 2016, 85 per cent of casualties were men in comparison to 93 per cent 
in 2015. Traditionally high male representation among security forces, peacekeepers 
and other combatants may explain this finding. The proportion of men, however, only 
marginally decreases when considering only civilian casualties.
Age-disaggregated data were only accessible for 36 per cent (154 casualties) of total 
casualties in 69 incidents. In these instances, 83 per cent were adults, while children26 
represented 17 per cent. These figures are in the same range as last year.27
CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES
Figure 8 illustrates that a civilian vehicle (agricultural, commercial and other civilian) 
triggered the AVM in 49 per cent (84 incidents) of recorded incidents involving a vehicle 
(173 incidents), while 57 per cent of incidents occurred with civilian vehicles in 2015. 
This proportional decrease reflects the trend observed for civilian casualties. Still, like in 
2015, civilian vehicles continue to be the most impacted in 2016, with a continued high 
number of farming-related incidents. They are followed by vehicles belonging to national 
security forces (24 per cent) and peacekeeping vehicles (8 per cent), for which the share 
has only varied slightly over the last two years.
A major spike was, however, recorded for humanitarian vehicles in both absolute and 
relative terms: from one incident in 2015 (less than 1 per cent of all vehicle-related 
incidents) to nine incidents in 2016 (5 per cent). A major part of this spike can be 
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Approximately 4 per cent (eight incidents) of recorded incidents did not involve a vehicle. 
In these cases, AVMs were detonated when someone tried to remove the AVM from 
the ground. In two incidents, one in Somalia and one in Angola, children were killed or 
injured after finding AVMs on the ground. As in 2015, livestock also triggered AVMs.
Breakdown of the civilian vehicle sub-categories (84 incidents in total)
FIGURE 8
  49% 
 Civilian  
 (excl. humanitarian)
  24% 
 National security  
 forces
  8% 
 Peacekeeping
  5% 
 Humanitarian
  3% 
 International security 
 forces
  11% 
  Unknown
Absolute numbers are: 84 civilian, 42 national security forces, 14 peacekeeping, 9 humanitarian, 
5 international security forces, 19 unknown






CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES 
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CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT
Since AVMs are designed to destroy vehicles, they have a large explosive charge that 
often causes several casualties. The average casualties per incident reached 2.3 in 
2016 which is a decrease compared to 2015 (3.4 casualties per incident). This reduction 
is mainly due to the lower number of casualties whereas the number of incidents 
remained stable.
The ratio of casualties per incident varied depending on the context as well as between 
states or territories (see Table 1). The type of vehicle, the number of passengers as well 
as the victim’s activity at the time of the incident impact the likely number of casualties.
Previous high average casualty rates in Syria, Pakistan and Ukraine were again recorded 
in 2016. However, among the seven states/territories with most incidents in both years 
(i.e. Ukraine, Mali, Syria, Cambodia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Western Sahara), 
the average numbers decreased for six of them – with only Cambodia noting an increase. 
In five instances (out of these six), the proportion of civilians amongst the casualties also 
dropped.
Syria accounted for the most significant decrease of civilian casualties, dropping from 
93 per cent in 2015 to 45 per cent in 2016. A reverse trend was noted in Afghanistan 
where the proportion of civilians among casualties spiked from 35 per cent to 
100 per cent in one year; while the overall number of AVM casualties remained the 
same (34), the number of incidents increased by 73 per cent between 2015 and 2016 
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include internally displaced persons moving by road, due to recent fighting, without 
knowledge of contamination or main roads being blocked by improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs), resulting in the local population trying to use alternative roads that are 
littered with AVMs.28
The 2016 data further indicate that the type of vehicle involved in an incident can cause 
different impacts on casualties. Understood as the ratio of killed to overall victims, 
the lethality rate of incidents with civilian vehicles (excluding humanitarian) reached 
52 per cent overall, whereas the same rate of incidents involving non-civilian vehicles 
amounted to 29 per cent.
This difference stems from the assumption that non-civilian vehicles (i.e. national security 
forces, international security forces, peacekeepers, other combatants) are more likely to 
be better armoured and to protect passengers from the effects of explosions than civilian 
















Ukraine 37 101 2.73 31% 43%
Mali 26 55 2.12 4% 29%
Afghanistan 19 34 1.79 100% 38%
Pakistan 18 52 2.89 40% 35%
Cambodia 16 16 1.00 100% 25%
Syria 12 38 3.17 45% 100%
Iran 11 9 0.82 100% 22%
Western Sahara 10 12 1.20 75% 25%
TABLE 1 CASUALTIES PER INCIDENT AND LETHALITY RATIO IN 2016
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Iran illustrates how AVMs continue to pose a legacy threat. The 2016 data capture 
the long-standing impact of contamination mainly from the conflict with Iraq in 
1980-1988. Remaining contamination is concentrated in the five western regions 
bordering Iraq, an area rich in oil fields; available estimations ranged from 250 km2 
to 280 km2 in 2014.29
Despite clearance efforts, AVM-related incidents still occur. The GICHD and SIPRI 
recorded 11 AVM incidents in these regions in 2016 – a significant increase compared 
to the previous year when three incidents were recorded. Over two years, two of 
them occurred during construction work and one when an oil company’s tractor set 
off an AVM in Musian County, Ilam province.
In 7 out of the 11 recorded incidents in 2016, AVMs were set off during clearance  
work. This high number stands out and supports a broader trend of reported 
demining incidents in Iran. According to the Landmine Monitor, one deminer 
was killed and 17 injured in 2014, whereas 28 and 71 deminer casualties were 
recorded in 2013 and 2012 respectively.30 While several factors testify to the 
challenging environment of AVM clearance in that country, such as the prevalence 
of non-metallic devices or possibly restricted access to technological advances in 
demining assets,31 further research is required to understand the high number in 
2016, from a larger quality management and occupational safety perspective.
BOX 3
FIGURE 9 MAP OF AVM INCIDENTS IN IRAN
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CATEGORIES OF VEHICLES IN IRANFIGURE 10




64%27% 9%  
| A locally developed demining tool that is installed in front  
| of a bulldozer in Iran



















In 2016, the GICHD and SIPRI recorded 181 incidents related or suspected to be related 
to AVMs in 22 countries and territories. This represents a 2 per cent increase of incidents 
compared to 2015. These incidents caused 423 casualties, among which 228 were 
injured and 195 killed – a 29 per cent reduction compared to the previous year. The 
proportion of civilians among casualties dropped from 60 per cent to 46 per cent over 
the two years.
The vast majority of the casualties in 2016 were suffered in conflict settings. This finding 
bolsters the previous year’s observation: 80 per cent of incidents in 2016 (81 per cent 
in 2015) and 88 per cent of casualties (91 per cent in 2015) occurred in those situations. 
Notwithstanding, the 2016 findings also testify to the sustained humanitarian and 
developmental impact of AVMs in post-conflict situations long after the conflict has 
ended.
This report also highlights that in certain states and territories, like Cambodia, the number 
of casualties due to AVM incidents has proportionally grown compared to the impact 
of other mines and ERW.
For the second year in a row, the joint research by the GICHD and SIPRI sheds light on 
an often-neglected humanitarian and developmental issue. AVM incident data remain 
incomplete and their longer-term consistency and reliability continue to be a challenge, 
particularly in conflict settings. As a consequence, actual figures on AVM incidents and 
AVM-related casualties are expected to be higher than in the findings of this report. 
Long-term and regular data collection is needed in order to identify trends, support 
further analysis on the humanitarian and developmental impact of AVMs and contribute 
to informed and evidence-based political discussions.
CONCLUSION
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ANNEX 1: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research methodology
This research draws on data from states, typically national mine action authorities/
centres, as well as from mine action and other humanitarian organisations. These reports 
were complemented by media reviews conducted in Arabic, English, French, Portuguese, 
Russian, Spanish and Urdu. Press articles were included, either because an incident was 
specially identified as AVM-related, or because an incident corresponded to a set of 
criteria that strongly indicated an AVM-related incident. These included incidents such 
as those on roads outside of a city involving a vehicle, but excluding remotely-detonated 
bombs, and causing multiple casualties. In cases where the criteria strongly suggested 
an AVM-related incident, the incident is referred to as a suspected AVM incident. In some 
instances, mine action authorities and organisations were able to assess the relevance 
and accuracy of retrieved press articles.
Incidents with an unknown number of casualties were categorised as incidents that 
resulted in casualties, but without specifying any absolute number. For incidents referring 
to a minimum number of casualties (“at least [number] casualties”), this minimum number 
was retained in this research. Furthermore, unless clearly attributed in the source, the 
vehicle category for incidents involving other combatants was defined as “unknown”.
This report provides an estimate of recorded AVM incidents and casualties in 2016, 
but due to the various methodological challenges below, actual figures are expected 
to be higher.
Data collection challenges
Data reported by states and organisations remain insufficient for a number of reasons. 
In some instances, states with suspected AVM incidents do not release any information 
at all. In other cases, data remain incomplete due to the inability of the national mine 
action authority or organisations to access certain areas of the territory. This is at least a 
challenge in current conflict areas where data collection and verification are particularly 
difficult. The nature of these weapons, and the fact that AVM incidents often take place 
in rural areas, also make their reporting challenging, specifically regarding the exact 
location of incidents.
Reports from states and organisations generally provide much more accurate and 
disaggregated information than media reports. Since the disaggregation of data is, to 
a large extent, dependent on reports from states and organisations, data collection 
becomes sensitive to the inactivity or closure of programmes due to a lack of funding or 
to security concerns. This may, therefore, impact the ability to access detailed data from 
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certain areas and analyse differences across years. The GICHD and SIPRI are continuously 
engaging with new actors in country, specifically in conflict areas, in order to ensure the 
most complete and long-term data availability.
Disaggregation of collected data on the type of device also proved to be a challenging 
task. It is often difficult to identify an AVM after detonation, in particular if specific 
circumstances, resources and the security situation do not allow a proper investigation 
to take place. In 2016:
• 53 incidents (29 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents 
with an identified or likely mine type;
• 43 incidents (24 per cent) were categorised as confirmed AVM incidents 
with an unknown device type;
• 85 incidents (47 per cent) were categorised as suspected AVM incidents.
An increased ratio of suspected AVM incidents compared to 2015, when 30 per cent 
of incidents were suspected to be related to AVMs, can be noted due, in part, to higher 
reliance on press articles in 2016.
Collecting disaggregated data on the sex and age of casualties remains a challenge. 
In 2016, it was only possible to disaggregate by sex in 45 per cent and by age in 
36 per cent of casualties. Sex-disaggregated data were available in 66 per cent of the 
field reports while only 30 per cent of the press articles provided this information.
Finally, IEDs may function as AVMs.32 AVMs can also be used as energetic charges of 
IEDs. This report is focused on industrial AVMs used in a conventional manner. Vehicle-
activated IEDs are therefore excluded from these data.
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ANNEX 2: NOTES AND REFERENCES
1 In this report, AVMs are defined as landmines designed to detonate by the presence, proximity or 
contact of a vehicle. It covers a wide range of vehicles that operate on land including tanks. AVMs 
are also commonly known as anti-tank mines as well as mines other than anti-personnel mines.
2 Casualties refer to individuals who were physically injured and/or killed.
3 SIPRI and GICHD (2014), The Humanitarian and Developmental Impact of Anti-Vehicle Mines.
4 The GICHD-SIPRI interactive maps are available at <http://www.gichd.org/avm>  
(accessed: 22 February 2017).
5 SIPRI and GICHD (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2015.
6 Figures in this report are subject to rounding up/down.
7 The definition of territory rests on the United Nations definition of Non-Self-Governing Territories.
8 SIPRI and GICHD (2016), Global Mapping and Analysis of Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents in 2015, p. 8.
9 The Landmine Monitor publishes data on anti-vehicle mine casualties every year. It recorded 
468 casualties in 18 states and other areas in 2015, 218 casualties in 17 states and other areas 
in 2014 and 212 casualties in 13 states and other areas in 2013. See International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines (2016), Landmine Monitor 2016, p. 51; International Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(2015), Landmine Monitor 2015, p. 28; International Campaign to Ban Landmines (2014), Landmine 
Monitor 2014, p. 36. Note: Due to the GICHD and SIPRI undertaking a more focused and 
disaggregated data collection on AVM incidents, comparison with Landmine Monitor data might 
only be possible to a limited extent.
10 In this report, the definition of conflict setting is based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP). The UCDP defines conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” (see for 
instance Wallensteen Peter and Sollenberg Margareta (2001), “Armed Conflict 1989–2000”, 
Journal of Peace Research 38(5), pp. 629–644). Due to the absence of UCDP data for 2016 at the 
time of writing the present report, the GICHD and SIPRI defined a conflict setting in 2016 based 
on whether there were more than 25 battle-related deaths in 2015 according to the UCDP. Using 
this proxy definition for 2016, 15 states/territories were considered to be in a conflict setting 
(Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Chad, Egypt, India, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, South 
Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Western Sahara, Yemen) and seven to be in a post-conflict phase (Angola, 
Cambodia, Iran, Israel, Rwanda, South Korea, Tunisia). Although Western Sahara was missing 
in the UCDP dataset that covers countries only, it was included in the list of states/territories in 
a conflict setting in this report. The UCDP data are available at <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/> 
(accessed: 28 February 2017). For more details on definitions, see UCDP/PRIO (2016), 
Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, Version 4-2016, at <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/
ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.pdf> (accessed: 28 February 2017).
11 All maps in this report are for illustrative purposes and do not imply the expression of any opinion  
on the part of the GICHD/SIPRI concerning the legal status of any state or territory, or concerning 
the delimitation of frontiers or boundaries. In addition, some incidents might appear as one 
in country maps due to their geographical proximity and the scale of the maps.
12 The number of anti-personnel mine casualties also increased from 13 in 2015 to 26 in 2016. 
See Landmine Monitor (2017), Cambodia Country Profile. Casualties and Victim Assistance, 
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page updated as of 27 January 2017, at <http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/cambodia/
casualties-and-victim-assistance.aspx#ftnref3> (accessed: 15 March 2017); e-Mail from 
Monoketya Nguon, Deputy Director Socio-Economic Planning and Database Management, 
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